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Co1T1mentary 
Corporate Integration: Do the 
Uncertainties Outvveigh the Benefits? 
R EED H . SHULDINER * 
Emil Suniey's article 1 (following the lead of the Treasury Report2 it-
self) divides into two parts. First, the paper discusses different ap-
proaches to implementing corporate integration and second, it discusses 
the overall economic impact of corporate integration. In my comments, 
I attack the problem in reverse order. I begin by offering a few com-
ments on the economic impact of integration, followed by a discussion of 
the approach to integration recommended in the T reasury Report. 
I. W E L FARE GAINS FROM INTEGRA T ION 
As Sunley points out , a m ajor contribution of the Treasury Report is 
that it makes a serious attempt to estimate the welfare gains from an 
integrated tax system. In part icul ar, the Treasury R eport estimates 
steady-state welfare gains equivalent to $2.5 billion to $25 billion per 
year. 3 Sunley does an admirable job of summarizing the source of the 
welfare gains, the methodology used to estimate the gains and the limita-
tions of the assumptions and the methodology. I would like to add a few 
comments. 
The econom ic models em ployed in the T reasury Report predict signifi-
cant gains from integration. As T reasury would be the first to admit, 
'however, the models that estimate these gains are very rough and the 
underlying behavioral assum pti•:ms (that determine the outcome of the 
models) are, at best, uncertain. In some cas·:::s, T reasury has come dosvn 
squarely on one side of an economic debate4 and in other cases, has 
" Assisumt Professor of Law, U ni vers ity of Pennsylvan ia Law School. T he author 
beJ;cfitted from d iscL1.ssions \V ith po. nic ipan ts a t the T ax Lc.v~' R eview Colloquium on Corpora te 
lrHegrc.t ion . In particu la r, 1 ·~vo~.1 ! d !ike to thank IVIichad Schler fo r cl arifyin g the :-o1e or 
§ 265 . 
1 Emii Sun ley, Corporate Integration : An Economic Perspective, 4 7 Tax L. Re·>'. 621 
(1992). 
2 Treasu ry .Dcp' t1 P .. eport en Integration oi th~ Ind ividua l and Corpora~e Tax Systems: 
T axing Business Income O nce ( 1992) [herei nafter T;-ea:;ury F .. eport]. 
J Id . at l l l. 
~ See! -? .g., the discussion of the ' 'nev..-· '..: i ~ \v .. versus the ' ·crac! it iona l view" of d ividends. Id. 
a t 116-1 8. 
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adopted a particular vievv out of the necessity to make a choice. 5 T he 
need to make such choices highlights the lack of cer tainty in th.:: 
estimates. 
Second, as the Treasury Report makes clear, the welfare estimates 
compare a steady-state world with a two-level corporate tax to a steady-
state world with an integrated corporate tax. The Treasury Report, how-
ever, makes no estimates of the transition costs of switching between the 
two steady-state systems. The transition costs could reduce significantly 
or even make negative the net efficiency gains from adopting an inte-
grated corporate tax. For example, assume that the true steady-state 
benefit of an integrated system is $2.5 billion per year and that the transi-
tion to an integrated system will take 10 years . Further assume that dur-
ing the transition period the net costs of transition are $2.5 billion per 
year and that the appropriate discount rate for the costs and benefits of 
integration is 8%. In that case, the present value of the benefits of inte-
gration is $14.5 billion, while the present value of the transition costs is 
$16.8 billion. In other words, overall, moving to an integrated system 
would cost $2.3 billion in present value terms. 
T hird, it is easy to misinterpret the presentation of a range of welfare 
estimates. The range of estimates represents a set of point estimates from 
distinct general equilibrium models, not a likelihood range. 6 For exam-
ple, in the case of the dividend exclusion prototype, the augmented 
Harberger model with no financial distortions estimates welfare gains of 
$2.5 billion. 7 H the best representation of the economy is the augmented 
Harberger model with no financial distortions, the Treasury Report 
should be viewed as producing a point estimate of $2.5 billion plus or 
minus some error. The Treasury Report, however, gives no guidance as 
to the size of the potential error relative to the point estimate of $2.5 
billion. 
The Treasury Report notes that the estimates of the gains from inte~ 
gration are of the same order of magnitud~ of the predicted gains fro rn 
the Tax R eform Act of 1986. 8 An interesting question is hmv vvell the 
economic models used to predict the 1986 A.ct gains performed . T he 
Office of Tax Policy Research of the University of Michigan commis·· 
sioned a series of studies (the 1986 Act Studies) to evaluate precisely this 
s Consider, for example, the discussion of whether it is more appropriate to assume an open 
or a closed economy. Treasury assumes a closed economy, justifying its decision on the lack of 
consensus as to the appropriate assumption. I d. at 141. 
6 Thus, for example, the range of S2.5 billion to S25 billion should not be interpreted as an 
exp~cted welfare gain of $13.75 billion with a 95% probability that the actual gain will be 
within the range of $2.5 billion to 5>25 billion. 
7 Treasury R eport, note 2. at 131 tbl. 13.7. 
g Id. at 2 n.4. T&.x R eform Act of 1986, Pub. L. l'-lo. 55·914, 100 St2.t. 2085. 
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question. 9 Although the results of the 1986 Act Studies were mixed, 
overall the studies found that actual responses were smaller than pre-
dicted responses. Joel Slemrod, the editor of the 1986 Act Studies, con-
cluded: "[T]here is a strong sense that behavioral elasticities are weaker 
than previously believed, and thus the efficiency cost of taxation is 
smaller than had been thought." 10 In particular, in the study most 
closely related to corporate integration, Roger Gordon and Jeffrey 
MacKie-Mason looked at the effect of the 1986 Act on corporate finan-
cial policy and organizational form. 11 Gordon and MacK ie-Mason gen-
erally concluded that the responses were significantly smaller than 
predicted and, in some instances, in the opposite direction. 
The 1986 Act Studies do not necessarily prove anything. The studies 
may have mismeasured the effects of the 1986 Act or they may have 
missed important variables confounding the analysis. Nevertheless, they 
do suggest that skepticism is warranted in evaluating the results of the 
Treasury Report. They also suggest that economic models may tend to 
have a bias towards predicting too great a response from tax changes. 
Such a bias could, for example, be introduced if the economic models 
systematically underestimate the ability of taxpayers to arrange their af-
fai rs in such a way as to neutralize the effect of certain tax rules. Addi-
tionally, the economic models may underestimate the effect of nontax 
factors on such questions as organizational form , debt-equity decisions 
and dividend payment rates. 
Where does all this leave us? The fact remains that the Treasury Re-
port represents a best guess that there are significant efficiency gains to 
integration, a conclusion that most economists likely share. Neverthe-
less, the considerations discussed above suggest that caution is warranted 
in assuming that the efficiency gains will be as large as predicted by the 
Treasury models. As Henry Aaron has pointed out, as efficiency consid-
erations from a proposed change in tax law diminish in importance, the 
equity considerations become relatively more important .12 
Considerations of equity are relevant in deciding both whether to 
move to an integrated system and the choice of integration prototype. 
Although, as discussed below, Sunley agrees that considerations of equity 
color the choice of integration prototype, he argues that the question of 
whether the United States should adopt corporate integration does not 
depend on the distributional effects of corporate integration because Con-
gress always could adjust marginal rates to maintain the progressive na-
9 The 1986 Act Studies are reported in Do Taxes Matte r'l The Impact of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 (Joel Slemrod, ed. , 1990) (hereinafter Do Taxes Matter0 ]. 
IO ld at 8. 
1! Roger E . Gordon & Jeffrey K . MacKie-Mason, Effects of theTa:; Re form Act of 1936 on 
Corporate Financia l Policy and Organ izati onal Form, in Do Taxes Matte r?, note 9, at 9 1. 
12 Henry J. Aaron, Lessons fm Tax Reform, in Do Taxes Mat ter0 , not ~ 9, at 326. 
··-------.... --waa•masaa 
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ture of the income tax. 13 While Sunley's point is generally correct, there 
are at least two caveats. First, to the extent that the incidence of the 
corporate tax both before and after integration is uncertain, it is difficult 
for Congress to compensate for integration in a meaningful manner. Sec-
ond, if a form of integration that taxes income from capital at a separate 
fixed rate (such as the dividend exclusion prototype 14 or the comprehen-
sive business income tax (CBIT) 15) is adopted, Congress' ability to com-
pensate for the distributional effects "'f integration will, in certain 
respects, be both limited and enhanced. Congress' ability will be limited 
because it will be unable to adjust the rate on capital income to take into 
account an individual shareholder's ability to pay. It will be enhanced 
because Congress can set the rate of tax on capital income independently 
from the rate on earned income. 
II. CHOICE OF PROTOTYPE 
While the economic models used by Treasury indicate that integration 
is worthwhile on efficiency grounds, they do not provide strong support 
as between prototypes. Therefore, guidance must come from some other 
source. Sunley begins with a simple proposition: " The goal of corporate 
integration is to tax corporate income once at the shareholder level, not 
once at the corporate level." 16 Implicit in this statement is the proposi-
tion that integration must respond both to efficiency concerns (taxing 
corporate income once) and equity concerns (taxing corporate income at 
a rate that is appropriate for the individual shareholder). Sunley thus 
takes the position that even if the decision to move to an integrated tax 
system is primarily a question of efficiency , the choice of integrated sys-
tems must be guided, at least in part, by considerations of equity. 
By contrast, the Treasury Report does not seem to give serious consid-
eration to issues of equity in the choice of prototype. 17 T he Treasury 
Report summarizes the goal of integration as follovvs: " Broadly speak-
ing, corporate tax integration seeks to reduce tax-induced distortions in 
the allocation of capital by taxing corporate source income once .... " 18 
The Treasury Report is thus focused on the income, rather than the re-
cipient of the income. In fact, it makes this point explicitly. It notes that 
a t raditional goal of integration has been to tax corporate income at the 
shareholder's rate, but concludes that: 
JJ Sunley, note I, at 64 3. 
:o~ Treasury Report , note 2, at 17. 
1s Id. at 40. 
16 Id. at 10. 
17 The T reasury Report does analyze the incidence of the proposed prototypes as part of its 
economic analysis of integration. Treasury Report. no1e 2, at 146-50. 
13 Id. at 12. 
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(a]ssuring that corporate income is taxed once, but only once, 
does not require that corporate income be taxed at individual 
rates, however. Attaining a single level of tax-with the most 
significant efficiency gains we project from any system of inte-
gration-can be achieved with a schedular system in which all 
corporate income is taxed at a uniform rate at the corporate 
level without regard to the tax rate of the corporate 
shareholder. 19 
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Given their divergent goals, it is not surpnsmg that Sunley and the 
Treasury Report end up with opposite conclusions. The Treasury Re-
port recommends the dividend exclusion prototype as the primary model 
for integration.20 Sunley, on the other hand, concludes that "[t]he divi-
dend exclusion prototype endorsed by the Treasury Report ... is a defec-
tive form of dividend relief." 21 
The Treasury Report does recognize that there may be some who con-
sider it important to tax corporate-source income at shareholder rates 
and does not reject such an approach outright. It simply asserts that it is 
not a sufficiently important goal at this time: 
A decision to adopt a schedular system for taxation of business 
capital is not irreversible. Future policymakers can, if they 
wish, add refund and crediting mechanisms to achieve the 
traditional objective of taxing corporate income at the individ-
ual shareholder's marginal rate, or they can address the issue 
by adjusting the corporate rate to more precisely approximate 
individual rates. Our judgment is that neither of these courses 
is necessary to achieve the principal benefits of an integrated 
tax system. They are options that can be added once the com-
piexities of transition have been mastered. Deferring them 
makes the integration prototypes examined in this Report sim-
pler to implement and conserves revenues. 22 
Overall, Sunley's critique of the Treasury Report is well founded. 
Moreover, a fai lure to come to grips with the equity issues, both real and 
perceived, ultimately will backfire. For example, consider the Treasury 
19 Id. At one point, the Treasury Report even implies that taxing income from capital at a 
fixed rate. rather than at a rate depending on the individual shareholder. is necessary for eco-
nomic efficiency. ld. The Treasury Report does not, however, provide any support for this 
statement. 
zo Treasury also recommends the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) model, but 
not as an immediate goal. Id. at 2. 
21 Sunley, note 1, at 626. 
22 T reasury Report, note 2, at 13. The revenue is, of course. conserved at the expense of 
lo w-bracket taxpayers investing in corporate equities. 
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Report's discussion of the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) in 
relation to the dividend exclusion prototype. The Treasury Report notes 
that historically, the AMT was adopted to respond to public perceptions 
that high-income individuals were not paying any (or sufficient) tax. 23 
The Treasury Report admits that the exclusion for dividends might re-
sult in some high-income individuals paying little or no tax at the indi-
vidual level "thus raising issues of public perception." 24 The Treasury 
Report's response is that the prototype's EDA, or earned dividend 
account: 
operates to ensure that any dividends excludable from an indi-
vidual's gross income have already been subject to one level of 
tax at the corporate level. The investor's income tax has been 
prepaid at the corporate level at the 34 percent corporate rate, 
which exceeds the top individual rate. 25 
To begin with, it is unclear the extent to which the Treasury Report's 
response is correct, even as a technical matter. Ultimately, the question 
of the tax burden on holders of corporate equity is one of incidence. As 
the Treasury Report notes, the incidence of the current corporate tax is 
uncertain, but probably does not fall entirely on shareholders.26 Simi-
larly, there is no reason to believe that under the dividend exclusion pro-
totype, the entire incidence of the corporate level tax would fall on 
shareholdersY If, as is probably the case, some part of the burden would 
be shifted to nonshareholders, the Treasury Report is incorrect when it 
implies that a shareholder would be taxed at an effective rate of 34% on 
dividends. 28 
More importantly, the Treasury Report's response misses the point. 
The Treasury Report correctly identifies the concern behind the AMT as 
one of perception, yet the Treasury Report's response is purely technical , 
ignoring the issue of perception. Unfortunately , nowhere in its report 
does Treasury adequately address the issue of perception. To the con-
trary, when it discusses issues of equity, the Treasury Report seems to 
2l Id. at 23, 45 & n.25 (discussion of AMT under CBIT). 
24 Id. at 23. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 146-47. 
27 The Treasury Report implicitly makes this point when, in discussing the impact of CBIT 
on interest rates, it suggests that the interest rate on CBIT debt may not reflect a 31% tax rate, 
suggesting, for example, that if a non-CBIT bond bore interest at a 10% pretax rate, a CBIT 
bond might bear interest at 8%. Id. at 50. Under such circumstances, the holder of CBIT 
debt would be bearing an implicit tax at a rate of only 20% suggesting that imposition of the 
AMT might well be appropriate. 
28 There is also the minor technical problem that the top marginal rate on an individual 
taxpayer may exceed 34% when the § 68 phase-out of itemized deductions and the § 151 
phase-out of personal exemptions is taken into account. 
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make things worse. For example, it recognizes that the dividend exclu-
sion prototype could be modified to include a credit mechanism to adjust 
for shareholder tax rates, but recommends against such a modification 
based on complexity.29 The Treasury Report seeks to bolster its position 
by arguing that relief for low-bracket taxpayers is unnecessary. First, it 
points out that approximately two-thirds of corporate dividends paid to 
taxable individuals are paid to individuals with average marginal tax 
rates of more than 25%, 30 suggesting, presumably, that the difference 
between a 25% marginal rate and a 34% marginal rate is insignificant. I 
would have thought that a 36% increase in marginal rate was quite sig-
nificant. With respect to those taxpayers facing tax rates of less than 
25%, the Treasury Report argues that such "low-bracket shareholders 
who receive dividends clearly own some property, i.e., stock, and it is not 
clear whether their low taxable incomes accurately reflect their ability to 
pay."31 In a footnote, the Treasury Report goes on to argue that "low 
taxable income is not necessarily inconsistent with wealth."32 
I share Sunley's somewhat incredulous response to these statements. 33 
It is true that income from capital is frequently undertaxed, but I would 
think that the amount of untaxed income tends to rise, not fall, with an 
individual's tax bracket. Thus, for example, if Treasury is proposing a 
proxy wealth tax, it is remarkable that it is being proposed only for those 
in the lower brackets. 
III. MisCELLANEous IssuEs 
In addition to the equity concerns discussed above, there are a variety 
of technical issues raised by both the dividend exclusion prototype and 
CBIT. The following is meant to highlight only a few of the technical 
lSSUeS. 
A. Transition to CBIT 
The Treasury Report recommends a 10-year phase-in for CBIT .34 
Sunley, on the other hand, argues against a long phase-in period and 
suggests instead a delayed effective date with limited grandfathering of 
29 Treasury Report, note 2, at 22. In the section entitled "Low-Bracket Shareholders," the 
Treasury Report rests its recommendation not to provide a tax credit on the grounds of ad-
ministrability and the lack of need for such a credit. Id. Elsewhere, the Treasury Report 
supports its position based not only on administrability, but also on the revenue saved by not 
taxing low-bracket shareholders based on their individual rates. See note 22 and accompany-
ing text. 
JO Treasury Report, note 2, at 22. 
]] !d. 
J2 Id. at 22 n.28. 
JJ Sun ley, note 1, at 626. 
34 Treasury Report, not~ 2, at 39; see id. at 91-92. 
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old debt. 35 Sunley claims that the delayed effective date would give com-
panies time to refinance non-CBIT debt with new CBIT debt and would 
lower the transactions costs as compared to a long phase in. 
With respect to corporate equity that has an indefinite life, it is clear 
that a grandfather rule is unacceptable because it would delay indefi-
nitely the adoption of integration. On the other hand, as the Treasury 
Report recognizes, a significant phase-in period is appropriate to moder-
ate the windfall gains and losses from transition. Debt potentially poses 
a different case than equity for two reasons. First, debt generally has a 
limited maturity and second, while dividend payouts can be "renegoti-
ated," absent the threat of bankruptcy, interest payments generally can-
not. 36 Therefore, the same transition rules are not necessarily 
appropriate for debt and equity. 
With respect to debt, there seem to be two principle alternatives. First, 
debt, like equity, could be subject to a 10-year phase in of the CBIT rules. 
Second, new debt could be immediately subject to the CBIT rules and old 
debt could be grandfathered. Overall, I think the latter alternative is 
preferable. Changing the tax treatment of old debt would lead to a sig-
nificant windfall gain to existing debt holders and a significant vvindfall 
loss to existing borrowers.J7 Additionally, there is potentially tremen-
dous complexity caused by the issuance of new debt subject to a phase-in 
rule. For exampie, consider the application of the original issue discount 
rules to a 1 0-year "fixed-rate" bond issued at the beginning of the phase-
in period. Economically, the parties would like to negotiate a declining 
interest rate to reflect the progressive adoption of the CBIT rules. Under 
existing law, however, if the debt provides for a declining interest rate, 
the OlD rules would act to redistribute the income on the bond to pro-
duce a constant yield, the incorrect result under the circumstances. On 
the other hand, if the parties decide to economically front load the inter-
est by setting a fixed rate, the OlD rules would respect the interest set by 
JS Sunley. note I, at 633. 
l6 The Treasury Report points out that some corporate debt can be called after a certai n 
period, permitting a company to refi nance its debt during the phase-in period . Tr~as ur:; Re-
port, note 2, at 9 1 n.l3. In other cases, however, debt is noncallable. If the CBIT rules -.ve;e 
applied to existing noncallable debt , companies might be able to repurchase such debt in the 
market , but there would be little point in doing so since the old debt ·,vou!d seil at a premium 
reflect ing its higher non-CBIT interes t rate. 
l 7 It should be noted, however. that grand fathering of pre-CB!T debt may also ),;ad to 
windfall gains to holders of such debt. As non-CBIT debt becomes rarer , the price for such 
debt may be bid up by tax exempts and other en tities wish ing to hold such deb t. See Michael 
J. G raetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa . 1..,. 
Rev. 47 ( 1977). The magnitude of the effect is likely to be small gi ven the existence or" substan-
tia l categories of permanent non-CBIT debt such as gove rnment bonds aud mortgages . 
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the parties. 3 8 The OID rules could be modified, but the potential com-
plexity is unattractive. 
The Treasury Report argues against a grandfather rule on the grounds 
that the coexistence of CBIT and non-CBIT debt "would create difficult, 
if not impossible, reporting burdens and administrative complexity and 
would inevitably result in uneven enforcement. " 39 While such considera-
tions are probably valid for corporate equity, given the intended coexis-
tence of CBIT and non-CBIT debt under the fully phased in CBIT 
system, the Treasury concern seems overblown. 
B. Section 265 
Section 265(a)(2) currently disallows a deduction for interest on in-
debtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax-exempt obli-
gations. In the case of the dividend exclusion prototype, the Treasury 
Report is agnostic as to the application of§ 265(a)(2) to debt incurred to 
carry stock paying exempt dividends. In particular, the Treasury Report 
correctly notes that disallowing a deduction for interest paid to a taxable 
lender would result in the imposition of two levels of tax and is, there-
fore, inconsis tent with the overall goal of integration. 40 In the case of 
CBIT, however, the Treasury Report recommends that § 265(a)(2) apply 
to (non-CBIT) taxpayers receiving CBIT interest and dividends. The 
Treasury Report states that interest disallowance is necessary to prevent 
the erosion of the CBIT base by investor level rate arbitrage through 
borrowing. ~ 1 
The need to apply § 265(a)(2) points to a weakness in the CBIT propo-
sal. The problern is that CBIT permits the coexistence of CBIT and non-
CBIT debt. Under such a system, a tax-exempt entity can circumvent 
the CBIT rule by using a taxable individual as a conduit for purchasing 
the CBIT debt. The tax-exempt entity could simply loan money to an 
individual who would in turn purchase CBIT debt. The corporation's 
t;n Eabi!ity would then effectively be offset by the individual's interest 
J8 The parties might we ll want to fro nt load the interest in order to in crease the amount of 
the pre-CBIT interest deduction. See Treasury Report , note 2, at 9 1. 
J? ld . at 90. 
4~-a Id. at :21. 
4 i ld. at 52-53. There are additional problems with not applying§ 265(a)(2) to CBIT inter-
ests. For inst:mce, absent the application of § 265(a)(2) to CBIT interests, CB IT entit ies could 
be used as a means of avoiding the § 265(a)(2) limitation on municipal bonds. An individual 
co;Jld borrow fu nds and transfer the funds to a wholly-owned corporation in exchange for 
stock. The corporat ion could then use the fund s to purchase municipal bonds and pay divi-
dends equal to the interest on the bonds. Both the corporation 's and the sha reholder's income 
woLdd be e:·:empt and the shareholder potentially would be permitted a deduction for the inter-
Est on the debt used to fund the corporation. This problem ex ists under both CBIT and the 
divid.: nd e;(clusion prototype. 
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deduction. 42 Application of § 265(a)(2) to CBIT interests, however, 
poses at least two problems. First, as noted by the Treasury Report in 
the case of the dividend exclusion prototype, application of § 265(a)(2) 
when the individual borrows from a taxable entity leads to two levels of 
tax on the underlying income, subverting the goal of integration. Second, 
§ 265(a)(2) is notoriously difficult to enforce. 
One alternative to § 265(a)(2) would be to treat non-CBIT debt as 
CBIT debt if it is used to purchase CBIT interests. Such a solution 
would, however, pose its own administrative problems. A second solu-
tion would be to apply § 265(a)(2) only if the borrowing was from a tax-
exempt entity. 4 3 
A third solution would be to impose a tax on the receipt of non-CBIT 
interest by tax-exempt entities. If such a tax were feasible, however, it 
would significantly reduce the justification for CBIT in the first place. 
A final solution would be to expand the CBIT treatment of interest to 
non-CBIT debt. Consider the effect of such a rule on several different 
classes of debt. The two largest categories of non-CBIT debt would 
probably be U.S. government debt and home mortgages. In both cases, 
the wisdom of CBIT treatment would depend, at least in part, on the 
extent to which the yield on the debt dropped to reflect CBIT treatment. 
In the case of government debt, the net effect of CBIT status would de-
pend on the relationship between the weighted average marginal tax rate 
of current holders of government debt compared to the implicit tax rate 
reflected in the revised yield on government debt. In particular, holders 
of government debt would be better or worse off depending on whether 
their individual marginal tax rate was greater than or less than the im-
plicit tax rate reflected in the revised yield on the debt after the imposi-
tion of CBIT. The government would be better or worse off depending 
on the aggregate mix of holders. 
Similarly, in the case of home mortgage interest, homeowners would 
be either helped or hurt to the extent that their marginal rate on deduc-
tions was less than or greater than the implicit tax rate reflected in the 
yield on CBJT debt. In general, high-bracket individuals would be hurt 
by such a change while low-bracket individuals and nonitemizers would 
be helped. Application of CBIT rules to some other classes of debt might 
-!' T he Treasury Report provides an example showing how the same approach can be used 
to purchase CBIT equity or corporate equity under the dividend exclusion prototype. Id. a t 
53. Presumably indirec t purchases of interests in corporations are not as great a problem 
under the di vidend exclusion prototype because the tax-exempt entity could always directly 
purchase a debt in teres t in the corporation and thereby avoid any tax on the corporate source 
income. 
·U Under this approach, a look-through rule would have to be employed to see if the ulti-
mate lender behind multiple layers of debt was a tax-exempt entity. Such an approach also 
would pos;; administrative problems. 
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be more troublesome. For example, if interest received from foreign per-
sons was tax-free, the government would get no compensating revenue 
from the nondeductibility of the interest. Finally, given the current non-
deductibility of personal interest, 44 the exclusion of such interest from 
income would not be compensated for by a denial of interest deductions 
to the borrowers. 
Overall, none of the solutions to the problem of leveraged investments 
in CBIT assets looks uniformly attractive. Application of§ 265(a)(2) is 
clearly overbroad; solutions that rely on tracing are likely to be 
unadministrable; taxing tax-exempt entities is likely to be difficult; and 
subjecting all debt to CBIT rules is likely to introduce a host of new 
problems. On the other hand, the problem is real. Absent some restric-
tions, tax-exempt entities will be able to use non-CBIT taxable in-
termediaries to avoid the CBIT rules. 45 
C. Other Structural Issues with CBIT 
Sunley describes CBIT as a stealth bomber, destroying portions of the 
tax code without warning. The Treasury Report seems to fail to recog-
nize some aspects of the stealth nature of CBIT. For example, § 163(d) 
currently limits the deduction of investment interest to the amount of net 
investment income.46 Under both CBIT and the dividend exclusion pro-
totype, a holder of a leveraged investment in corporate equity would 
have no investment income from dividends and, therefore, her interest 
would become nondeductible. Given that the Treasury Report takes the 
position that the corporation is paying a proxy tax for the shareholder, 
the amount of the dividend (grossed up by the amount of the tax) argua-
bly should be included in investment income for purposes of§ 163(d).47 
A final example of the wide-scale effects of CBIT concerns § 263A(f) . 
Section 263A(f) requires the capitalization of interest with respect to self-
constructed assets and inventory. The Treasury Report states that under 
CBIT, § 263A(f) could be repealed. 4 8 I have always understood that 
§ 263A(f) was intended as an indirect means for taxing the expected in-
+~ IRC § 163(h). 
45 While § 265(a)(2) addresses a real problem, the Treasury Report appears to be incorrect 
when it suggests that§ 265(a)(l) should apply to CB IT interests. Section 265(a)(l) disa llows a 
deduction fo r expenses other than interest allocable to tax-exempt income. Gi ven that income 
from CBIT interests has already been taxed at th e entity level and given the fact th at the 
noninterest expenses allocable to such income are unlikely to be paid to tax-exempt entities, 
there would appear to be no reason to apply§ 265(a)(l) to CBIT interests. 
46 For a general discussion of the pu rpose behind § 163(d), see Reed Shuldiner, A General 
Approach to the Taxat ion of Financia l Instruments, 71 T Ex. L. REv. 243 , 273-75 (1 992). 
47 The investment in terest expense would still need to be subject to § 265(a)(2) or whatever 
solution to the tax-exempt entity problem discussed above ultimately was adopted. 
48 Treasury Report , note 2, at 52. 
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crease in value in self-constructed assets and inventory. 49 If that is the 
case, the Treasury Report is correct that § 263A(f) could be repealed. 
The provision, however, could be repealed not because the underlying 
problem had been solved by CBIT, but rather because given the general 
nondeductibility of CBIT interest, the provision would have become inef-
fectual. The underlying problem would, however, remain. 
~ 9 .Sec Thomas Evans, The Evolution of Federai l nco n1 e Tax Ac~~ounting-P~ Grovlin g 
Trend Towards Mark -to-Ma rk et. 67 Taxes 824, 82 7- 28 ( i 989). 
